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Abstract: This paper reviews the evidence on external costs of risky behaviors in the U.S. 
and provides a framework for estimating them. External costs arise when a person does not 
bear all the costs of his or her behavior. They provide one of the strongest rationales for 
government interventions. Although the earlier estimates of external costs no longer have 
policy relevance, they demonstrated that the existence of external costs was an empirical 
question. We recommend that the estimates of external costs be updated as insurance 
structures, environments, and knowledge about these behaviors change. The general aspects 
of external costs may apply to countries other than the U.S. after taking into account 
differences in institutional, policy and epidemiological characteristics. 
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1. External Costs of Health Related Behaviors 
External costs arise when a person or a group does not bear all the costs of his or her actions, thus 
some of the costs are borne by others or by society at large. The costs that a person bears as a 
consequence of his or her actions are called internal (private) costs. External costs are not considered 
in a person’s decision making because they are borne by others. Possible external costs of any   
health-related behavior primarily derive from public or private group health insurance and from events 
directly causing harm to others (e.g., traffic crash or secondhand cigarette smoke). External costs are 
relevant on the grounds of fairness and efficiency. They become an issue of fairness when someone 
pays unwillingly or unknowingly for the actions of others. Grounds of economic efficiency apply 
when paying the full costs of their own action leads to an overall higher level of efficiency by a change 
in personal behavior, i.e., the benefits are more than the losses associated with the change, regardless 
of who gains or loses.  
This is the first comprehensive study to examine the existing evidence on the external costs of the 
leading actual causes of death—smoking, poor diet/physical inactivity, and excessive alcohol 
consumption. Despite of the large number of studies on total costs, which do not differentiate between 
internal and external costs [1-9], relatively few studies estimated external costs of health related 
behaviors. This paper develops an analytical framework for estimating external costs and discusses 
current controversies related to the definition and analysis of these costs. It tries to balance the 
economic and the public health perspectives and generates policy questions, issues and 
recommendations with regard to the role of external costs in developing public health policies.  
2. Framework for Estimating External Costs 
Because risky health behaviors contribute to acute and chronic diseases which lead to high medical 
expenses, it seems straightforward that these behaviors also lead to an overall financial burden on 
those with healthier behaviors due to group health insurance programs. This, however, is more 
complex and requires three considerations: An analysis of cost differential between the group with 
risky behavior and the group without it should be conducted within a lifecycle framework. The 
attribution of differentials in costs to each behavior should be determined while controlling for other 
risky behaviors and characteristics that could contribute to this cost difference. And, finally, individual 
contributions to health care financing and other aspects of possible financial programs through Social 
Security, life insurance, or sickness benefits should be included in estimation of external costs.  
If a risky behavior leads to premature death, there are competing financial influences. On the one 
hand, higher health care costs may be imposed in the short run, but on the other hand, the society may 
spend less additional resources for two possible reasons: Health care expenditures increase 
dramatically with age and those expenses are more heavily subsidized for older adults than for younger 
persons. And persons with risky health behaviors may collect Social Security and pension benefits for 
a shorter time than those with healthier behaviors; however, the dependents of the deceased may 
receive public financial support. Therefore, the net financial effect of premature death is an empirical 
question.  
There are disputable issues related to external costs. Some may argue that because Medicare and 
Medicaid are entitlement programs which the society has chosen to fund, they should not be Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2010, 7          
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considered in the estimation of external costs. However, the willingness to fund health care for elderly 
and poor may differ from the willingness to pay for modifiable behaviors, such as smoking or   
excessive drinking. 
Another disputable issue is the costs born by family members. Economists generally view the 
family as the decision-making unit, therefore costs to family are usually considered private. However, 
society may cover costs associated with developmental problems of infants and children that are 
attributable to maternal smoking and drinking. In addition, costs imposed on children could be viewed 
external. When deciding to get married an adult presumably accepts the consequences of the spouse’s 
risky health behaviors, but children do not choose their parents.  
3. Methods 
We searched PubMed and EconLit databases for the period 1982–2008, using both indexed 
(keyword) and free-text terms. Boolean logic was used to establish relationships between the concepts 
risky behavior and cost as well as fetal alcohol syndrome and cost. We also hand-searched the working 
papers of the National Bureau of Economic Research and checked references of related articles. We 
then screened them to identify those with empirical estimation of external costs and distinguished 
studies which had considered the important components of external cost estimation from those   
which had not.  
Limitations with settings, methods and assumptions of the available studies did not allow synthesis 
of the findings. Therefore, the findings are presented as they appeared in the literature, followed by the 
amount adjusted for inflation in 2009 dollars. The main methods used in estimating external costs 
were: (1) non-smoking smoker construct, which is based on epidemiological observation that smokers 
differ systematically from non-smokers [10]. Therefore, the differentials in mortality and medical care 
use between smokers and nonsmokers should not be attributed to the smoking habit per se. The same 
construct should be applied to other habits. (2) Cost of illness and human capital approach, which 
estimates costs of medical treatment and productivity losses; and (3) Willingness to pay (WTP) and 
value of statistical life (VSL) approaches. WTP assesses what people are willing to pay (or accept) for 
relatively small changes in the risk of death. Based on WTP estimates, the economists developed VSL. 
To understand this concept, it helps to think in terms of risk exposure. When the risk of fatal accident 
is 1:100,000, statistically there is 1 death per 100,000 people. Changes in the risk level imply changes 
in the number of statistical lives saved. The economic value is essentially the marginal rate of 
substitution of wealth for risk of death.  
4. Smoking 
4.1. Earlier Studies 
The earlier studies on external costs of smoking were primarily motivated by the question whether 
the society subsidized smoking. It was based on the traditional view of tobacco policy, where tobacco 
was treated as any other product and tobacco taxes were to be set equal to external costs it imposed on 
society. These studies indicated that the current external costs were lower than the taxes [11-14].  Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2010, 7          
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The estimated lifetime external costs were $1,000 per smoker or a net external cost of 15 cents per 
pack of cigarettes at a 5% discount rate in 1986 U.S. dollars, not including costs imposed on family.
 
This adjusts to $1,958 per smoker or a net external cost of 29 cents per pack of cigarettes in 2009 U.S. 
dollars. If the costs of maternal smoking and smoking-related fires were included, this estimate would 
range from 31 to 52 cents per pack in 1986 U.S. dollars ($0.61 to $1.02 in 2009 U.S. dollars) [11,12]. 
The average retail price of a pack of cigarettes was about $1 per pack in 1986 U.S. dollars ($1.96 in 
2009 U.S. dollars). 
Viscusi [14] updated these findings [11,12]. At a 5% discount rate, with tar adjustment Viscusi’s 
estimate of insurance externalities were $0.32 per pack in 1993 dollars ($0.48 in 2009 U.S. dollars). 
He further included costs of passive smoking. The estimated highest cost to society was 41 cents per 
pack in 1993 dollars (61 cents in 2009 dollars). Under different assumptions and discount rates, 
smokers saved society 18 cents per pack (27 cents in 2009 dollars). The average retail price of a pack 
of cigarette at the time this study was conducted was $1.69 in 1993 dollars ($2.5 in 2009 dollars). Like 
the previous studies, the cost of maternal smoking was not considered external [14]. However, Evans 
et al. estimated the costs of maternal smoking to be 42 to 72 cents per pack in 1994 dollars ($0.61 to 
$1.04 in 2009 dollars) [15], which were almost as much or higher than the overall estimated external 
costs for previous studies. The average retail price of a pack of cigarette was $1.75 in 1994 dollars 
($2.53 in 2009 dollars). Future earning losses of low-birth weight children due to developmental and 
behavioral problems were not included. Hay (1991) estimated these costs at approximately $4.10 per 
pack in 1990 dollars ($6.73 in 2009 dollars), which was probably an extreme value [16].  
Our understanding of the epidemiology, economics and overall effects of smoking has changed 
since these studies were conducted, and the above estimates do not have direct policy relevance today. 
Moreover, a new approach in behavioral economics views tobacco consumption as different from 
other products, suggesting that internal costs could also play a role in taxation policy. Taxation 
becomes a self-control device for smokers who may want to protect their future self from their current 
self. In this framework, the appropriate tax levels exceed the external costs [17]. 
4.2. Environmental Tobacco Smoke (ETS) 
When the above studies were conducted, the health and associated economic effects of ETS were a 
major point of empirical contention in the literature [18]. A 2006 Surgeon General’s Report [19] 
concluded that the evidence to infer a causal relationship between ETS exposure, lung cancer and 
cardiac diseases among nonsmokers was sufficient. ETS exposure was estimated to cause 46,000 
cardiac deaths—at least 10 fold higher than lung cancer deaths; over a million episodes of childhood 
respiratory illnesses and middle-ear infections; and over 400 sudden infant death syndrome (SIDS) 
deaths annually.  
A study by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency [20] concluded that the ETS costs were 
substantial and that the ban on smoking in all worksites would lead to total benefits between $39 
billion and $71 billion annually, equivalent of $2.45 to $4.45 per pack of cigarettes in 1993 dollars. In 
2009 dollars, these benefits would be between $58 billion to $105 billion annually, equivalent of $3.64 
to $6.61 per pack of cigarettes. Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2010, 7          
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A summary of several economic studies on ETS found that the lowest grand total estimated costs of 
ETS were $14.7 billion, the average were $75.4 billion and the highest were $167 billion in 2000 U.S. 
dollars [21]. This adjusts to $18.31 billion, $93.9 billion, and $208 billion in 2009 dollars for the 
lowest, average and highest grand total estimated costs respectively. Most of the studies considered the 
effect of ETS on infants and children. 
4.3. External vs. Internal (Private) Cost 
Sloan et al. were the only study to provide a systematic accounting of how the costs of smoking 
were distributed among smokers and nonsmokers [21]. The comparison was for estimates that 
indicated where costs arose not who actually paid them. The grand total of estimated costs of smoking 
was $323 billion annually in 2000 U.S. dollars ($402.41 billion in 2009 dollars), of which smokers 
appeared to impose costs outside their own families of less than $5 billion a year ($6.23 billion in 2009 
dollars). In the context of nearly $70 billion spent on cigarette purchases ($87 billion in 2009 dollars), 
“this appears to be an extraordinarily modest amount” [21].   
In 2000 the estimated present value of private cost of smoking to a 24-year old smoker was 
$141,181 over the lifecycle and $32.78 per pack in 2000 dollars ($175,892 and $40.84 respectively in 
2009 dollars). The costs to spouses and for infant deaths (quasi-external costs) were an estimated 
$23,407 over the lifecycle or $5.44 per pack ($29,162 or $6.78 respectively in 2009 dollars). The 
external costs were much smaller—$6,201 per 24-year-old smoker, net of federal and state cigarette 
excise taxes paid by smokers ($7,726 in 2009 dollars). On a per-pack basis, the external cost was $2.20 
in contrast to $0.76 in excise taxes paid per pack, i.e., $1.44 net of taxes ($2.74, $0.95 and $1.79 in 
2009 dollars respectively). In the year 2000, the average retail price of a pack of cigarettes was $3.12 
($3.89 in 2009 dollars). 
In later studies the estimates of private mortality costs ranged from about $25 per pack (15 percent 
or higher discount rates) to an estimated $222 per pack for men and $94 per pack for women (3 
percent discount rate) in 2006 dollars [22]. If adjusted to 2009 dollars, these costs would range from 
about $27 to $236 per pack for men and $100 per pack for women. The average retail price of a pack 
of cigarette in 2006 was $3.93 ($4.18 in 2009 dollars). Another estimate of private mortality costs was 
around $35 per pack (3 percent discount rate) in 2002 U.S. dollars ($37 in 2009 U.S. dollars) [23]. 
Differences in these private mortality cost estimates were mostly because of differences in the 
assumptions of the models. 
Overall, estimates of external costs of smoking depended greatly on the choice of discount rate, on 
inclusion of costs of ETS-related deaths and maternal smoking, and on the value of statistical life used.  
5. Physical Inactivity and Obesity 
An early study related to externalities of physical inactivity [24] estimated that the lifetime subsidy 
to a person with a sedentary lifestyle was under $2,000 in 1986 dollars ($3,915 in 2009 dollars), more 
than the current estimate of $1,000 for external costs of smoking ($1,958 in 2009 dollars) [12], but less 
than the external costs for heavy drinking of $3,200 ($6,264 in 2009 dollars), even when excluding 
costs for crime and traffic accidents [12]. The results were most sensitive to the assumption about the 
effects of inactivity on mortality. If the effect was assumed to be large, sedentary persons paid much Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2010, 7          
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more in Social Security taxes than they lived to collect in pensions and nursing home care. If sedentary 
lifestyle had no effect on mortality, costs for medical care and sick leave for sedentary persons were 
subsidized by others.  
Bhattacharya and Sood [25] estimated the loss of social welfare from obesity to be about $150 per 
capita of the insured population in 1998 dollars ($197 in 2009 dollars). Obesity could have external 
effects through health insurance coverage only if premium setting ignored obesity. This social welfare 
loss occurred only when two conditions existed. First, persons of normal weight in the pooled-risk 
insurance plan paid part of the expenditures for the people who had health problems because of excess 
weight; and second, being in a pooled-risk insurance plan had an impact on people’s eating and 
physical activity behaviors. Otherwise, it would be a case of mere payment transfer from persons of 
normal weight to persons with excess weight. This study had assumed that the second condition was 
true; however, currently available studies do not provide conclusive evidence about it [26,27]. Some 
studies estimated the annual obesity-attributable medical care expenditures that were paid by public 
health insurances [28,29], but they did not account for the payments the obese persons made for health 
insurance or for their tax contributions, and did not control for other risky health behaviors.  
A new aspect in this area is the issue of positive externalities of obesity, i.e., the non-obese may 
benefit from the obesity epidemic due to induced innovation in biomedical research and medicine [30]. 
First, biomedical researchers are quite responsive to changes in disease prevalence in the population. 
Private markets reward this responsiveness with profits for pharmaceutical firms, and the National 
Institutes of Health rewards this responsiveness with grant funding to universities and medical schools. 
Second, non-obese persons who suffer from conditions that are more common among the obese also 
benefit from innovations induced by the obesity epidemic [31]. 
Another new area of research is the immediate and long-term impact of maternal obesity on life and 
health course of the child [32], which could amount to substantial external costs for the offspring. 
Medical evidence of the link between fetal environment and neonatal outcome is growing, with likely 
influence on future adult morbidities.  
6. Excessive Alcohol Use 
Several studies provided strong evidence of high external costs associated with alcohol   
abuse [11,12,33-42]. The lifetime external costs of heavy drinking were estimated to be $42,000 in 
1986 U.S. dollars ($82,213 in 2009 U.S. dollars), of which more than 90% was due to drunk driving, 
crime, and property damage
 [11,12]. The estimated $17.6 billion of external costs of death and injury 
due to drunk driving were almost 4 times the estimated $4.7 billion of penalties paid by persons 
convicted of drunk driving in 1986
  ($34.45 billion and $9.2 billion in 2009 U.S. dollars   
respectively) [35]. Current alcohol taxes were found to be too low. Stricter drunk driving laws and 
information provisions would reduce externalities, which at the time were estimated to be $60.16 per 
occasion of drunk driving in 1986 U.S. dollars ($117.76 in 2009 U.S. dollars), while average penalties 
paid by drunk driver were only $16.15
 ($31.61 in 2009 U.S. dollars) [35,36]. 13.8% of alcohol-
attributable crash costs were external, and the crash costs per drink were estimated to be $0.42 in 1995 
U.S. dollars ($0.56 in 2009 U.S. dollars), which included costs of pain, suffering and lost quality of life 
in addition to the medical, travel, property damage, productivity losses and administrative costs [37]. Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2010, 7          
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The estimates of crime costs ranged from $25.9 billion in 1992 U.S. dollars [38] to $99.6 billion in 
1999 dollars [39]. This adjusts to a range from $40.8 billion to $128.3 billion in 2009 U.S. dollars for 
crime costs. 
Another source of external costs is drinking during pregnancy which can lead to fetal alcohol 
spectrum disorders (FASD). The lifetime total costs per individual with FAS were estimated to be $2 
and $2.9 million in 2002 dollars [40-42]. If discounted, these costs were $931,742 and $1,466,875 
respectively in 2002 dollars [42]. After adjusting for inflation, the lifetime costs per individual with 
FAS were an estimated $2.4 million and $3.5 million in 2009 dollars, and the discounted lifetime 
values were $1.1 million and $1.8 million in 2009 dollars. Costs associated with crime attributable to 
FASD were not included. Furthermore, external costs were not separated from these estimated   
total costs. 
Carpenter and Dobkin [43]
 found that granting legal access to alcohol at age 21 led to large and 
immediate increases in alcohol consumption, and that a 1 percent increase in the number of days a 
young adult drinks results in a 0.4 percent increase in total mortality. Given that mortality due to 
external causes, such as car accidents, suicide, homicide, deaths with a mention of alcohol use peaked 
at about age 21, their results suggested that policy interventions to reduce youth drinking could have 
substantial public health benefits and could reduce external costs. In addition, in 2000 and 2004 
excessive alcohol use was identified as a risk factor for risky sexual behavior among youth [44,45]. In 
2008 drinking was suggested to be a possible risk factor for Alzheimer’s disease [46]. These could 
further add to the already large external costs associated with alcohol.  
7. Conclusions  
The estimates of external costs must be updated as the health insurance structures, medical practices 
and technologies, environments and our knowledge about the effects of these risky behaviors change. 
Although many of the early estimates of externalities are no longer relevant for today’s policy, they 
demonstrate that the existence and magnitude of external costs are empirical questions, and that the 
assumptions of the models may lead to qualitatively different results. External costs are most relevant 
for policy when people change their behaviors in response to costs, i.e., paying the full costs of their 
actions leads to reduction in risky behaviors. For smoking and alcohol consumption it is well 
documented that increasing costs through excise taxes reduces consumption [1,2]. If there is no 
behavioral change, then policy intervention leads to a mere transfer of payments from people without 
risky behavior to people with risky behavior. This serves the fairness purpose of reducing external 
costs, but not the efficiency purpose.  
It is useful discussing how these potential external effects can be addressed most directly and why 
they have not been resolved yet. Aligning the private costs of risky behaviors with the social costs 
appear to be straight-forward to implement. However, there have been significant differences in the tax 
policies of smoking and alcohol. Despite of the enormous external costs of excessive drinking, excise 
taxes on alcoholic beverages have been little adjusted for decades, with effective rate of taxation 
declining over the years. On the other hand, from 2002 to 2009 cigarette tax rates were increased for 
88 times by 46 states, D.C., and several US territories. In 2009 the federal tobacco tax was increased 
from 39 cents to $1.01, partly with the goal of reducing smoking, thus improving health. This Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2010, 7          
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difference may be explained by the difference in political influence of the two industries [47], but there 
is another important difference. For alcohol, harm and particularly externalities arise from excessive 
consumption. An occasional drink may even have health benefits. On the other hand, there is no safe 
level of smoking. The public anti-smoking sentiment appeared to have led policies and taxes on 
cigarettes, mostly based on growing public awareness of smoking and health [48-50].
 With present 
public budget deficits, taxing cigarettes and alcohol has gained stronger political and public support. 
Taxing sugared drinks are currently proposed to help finance health-care reform in addition to 
expected health benefits [51,52]. However, in general, taxation may not be appropriate for obesity. 
First, taxes on over-consumption of food would be more appropriate than taxes on consumption, and 
such taxes are not feasible. Second, food is a necessity and taxing it increases the budgetary burden on 
poor families, because the share of income spent on food is higher for the poor than it is for the rich.  
Taxation has another economic aspect. There is gain, i.e., surplus, to people when the prices they 
pay for products they enjoy is less than their maximum willingness to pay for them. When taxation 
increases prices, consumer’s response  will  likely be reduced consumption, involving changes in 
private surplus. Two economic models predict this change differently. According to the model of  
time-inconsistent preferences, persons with risky behaviors will be better off because taxes will serve 
as a self-control device helping them achieve what they eventually want to do, i.e., quit smoking, 
drinking or eating excessively. On the other hand, the standard economic model predicts that those 
with risky behaviors will be worse off because the policy intervention will constrain their rational 
choices. This loss in private surplus will be due to the fact that consumers will have to pay more for 
the amount of the product they still continue to consume, and they also will have to consume less of 
something they enjoy. Comparing changes in private surplus for these risky behaviors can be an 
important topic for future research. Future research should also address the substitution of one risky 
behavior for another when taxes were imposed to limit each behavior in isolation. This substitution 
might lead to higher overall external costs because the external costs of each behavior are different. 
Much interest has been given to possible externalities to employers that stem from medical costs 
and reduced productivity due to employees’ risky health behaviors. To offset these costs, employers 
most likely adjust wages; this action eventually would lead individuals with risky health behaviors to 
partially or fully internalize their higher health care costs [53-57]. Reducing externalities would also 
include higher insurance premiums of co-pays for persons with risky health behaviors. Although 
private health insurance has started to differentiate insurance premiums on the basis of risky health 
behaviors, it appears unlikely that the public sector will. Most of the studies explored the question 
whether risky health behaviors gave rise to externalities. The other direction of causality, whether 
externalities associated with insurance have an effect on person’s behaviors is a relatively new area of 
empirical research and the results are inconclusive [26,27]. 
All available studies used data on adult populations with health insurance, including Medicare and 
Medicaid. Persons between age 18 and 64 years who were obese or who smoked or abused alcohol 
were more often uninsured than those who did not have these risky behaviors [58].
 Being uninsured 
before one becomes eligible for Medicare may affect overall lifetime external costs. These costs may 
increase if (1) Medicare pays for severe conditions that could have been prevented or controlled if 
persons with risky behaviors had health insurance earlier in life and (2) the external costs when 
covered by health insurance were lower than the increase in Medicare expenditures later in life. On the Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2010, 7          
 
 
2468
other hand, external costs could decrease if being uninsured reduced longevity, leading to overall 
reduction in Medicare expenditures and pensions. 
External costs provide one of the strongest economic justifications for government interventions, 
but there are other justifications, such as public health ethics and altruism [17,18,59-63]. Creating 
programs that get people pay the full costs of their behavior, providing information about health 
consequences of these behaviors, taxing risky habits to protect one’s future self from their current 
self—all of these approaches could improve health. However, maximizing health at any cost may not 
be the exclusive objective of policy. Trading health for money is not uncommon [64,65]. Thus, in 
reports of future research focusing on public intervention to reduce risky health behaviors, explicit 
statement of the rationales for government interventions would be useful. 
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